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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to provide an empirical analysis concerning the different aspects of profitability of 
the Italian manufacturing firms of intermediate size, namely medium and medium-large size 
companies, for the period 2004-2010. It analyzes various aspects of firm profitability relating 
corporate structures, that is, capital structure, risk component, asset composition, and growth 
opportunities. The study investigates firm profitability by using econometric panel-data techniques, 
such as the system dynamic GMM estimator that assures the robustness of our empirical analysis. 
One of the main results of our investigation is that we find a significant and negative impact of capital 
structure (i.e. leverage and tangibility) and risk component on firm profitability.  
 
JEL classification: C23, G32, L25, L60,  
Keywords: Mid-sized Italian firms, profitability, panel data, GMM. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The paper aims to provide an empirical analysis of profitability of the Italian manufacturing firms of 
intermediate size for the period 2004-2010, and uses the System GMM estimator for the estimation 
of dynamic panel data models. The present study contributes to extend the empirical literature on 
profitability of mid-sized Italian manufacturing firms, by focusing on the firm-specific determinants 
on profitability, as well as the relationship between corporate structure and firm performance. 
Thus, this contribution is an empirical investigation that focuses on profitability of Italian 
manufacturing firms of intermediate size, which are essentially medium and medium-large size joint 
stock companies. They are characterized by family ownership, high degree of internationalization, 
continuous product innovation, specialization in high quality products, and strong ties with the Italian 
industrial districts; also, these firms usually operate under conditions of monopolistic competition 
(Colli, 2005; Coltorti, 2006; Coltorti et al., 2013; Schilirò, 2011, 2012). 
In addition, this paper investigates the behavior of Italian manufacturing firms of intermediate size 
and their peculiar corporate structure, by focusing on risk component, asset composition, capital 
structure, growth opportunities, and the relationship of these factors with the firms’ performance. 
The empirical results of this study provide evidence that firms appear to operate in condition of 
monopolistic competition, since profits tend to persist over time, which may be a consequence of 
product differentiation and specialization in high quality products, as the empirical literature on the 
mid-sized Italian manufacturing firms seems to suggest (Colli, 2005; Coltorti, 2006, 2014; Coltorti et 
al., 2013). Also, profitability, for this category of firms, is inversely related to the leverage ratio, and 
the relationship between firm asset tangibility and profitability is negative. Finally, profitability is 
inversely related to the risk variable.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the topic of profitability of firms in light of 
the theoretical literature; section 3 introduces the framework of our analysis by describing the mid-
sized Italian manufacturing firms and their peculiar features; section 4 analyzes the data and the 
estimation method; section 5 shows the empirical model; section 6 discusses the empirical results; 
section 7 provides the conclusions and proposes the objectives for future research.  
 
II. LITERATURE ON PROFITABILITY OF FIRMS 
The economic literature on profitability of firms is vast and involves many fields like strategic 
management, accounting and finance, and industrial economics. Since firm profitability is affected 
by numerous factors, for the purpose of our empirical analysis, we find convenient to look at different 
theoretical strands. Thus, to consider firm specific effects on profitability, we look at strategic 
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management literature, and in particular to the resource-based view. This theoretical strand claims 
that the bundle of resources, organizational structure, and management practices of the firm establish 
a link between the internal characteristics of the company and its performance (Teece, 1981; Barney, 
1991; Peteraf, 1993, Levinthal, 1995). Consequently, according to the resource view model, the 
heterogeneity in profitability across firms,  is the result of the persistent differences in their specific 
characteristics (Rumelt, 1991; Hawawini et al., 2003). Empirical literature shows that in this type of 
models above-average profits are the result of tangible (financial and physical factors of production) 
and intangible (e.g. technology, reputation) resources that reflect the distinctive capabilities of the 
firm, which are rare or costly to be copied or imitated. Empirical findings broadly confirm the 
dominance of firm-specific factors in determining the firm’s profitability with respect to industry-
specific and country-specific aspects (Rumelt, 1991; McGahan, Porter, 1997; Claver, Molina, Tarí, 
2002; Hawawini et al., 2003; Brito, Vasconcelos, 2006, Kachlami, Yazdanfar, 2016).  
Another strand of literature we look at is corporate finance. It is well known that corporate finance 
literature has traditionally focused on the study of financial decisions, mostly long-term decisions, 
therefore corporate structure and dividends, fall among the topics it studies. We are particularly 
interested, in the empirical literature regarding the effect of capital structure on firm’s performance 
(Berger, Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006; Zeiturn, Tian, 2007), but also the analysis of corporate 
sustainability performance (Artiach et al. 2010). The latter authors support the view that leading firms 
have higher levels of growth and a higher return on equity than conventional firms, but do not have 
lower leverage than other firms. Furthermore, we consider the literature on firm growth and the 
relationship between growth and profits (Goddard et al., 2005; Coad, 2007). In particular, Goddard 
et al. (2005) have examined the financial drivers that could impact on firm’s profitability in European 
manufacturing and services. These authors looked at the relationship between size and profitability, 
and adopted the return on asset (ROA) as a measure of profitability. They found that a firm’s 
profitability is negatively related with size and gearing ratio and positively related with market share 
and liquidity. Finally, we take into consideration the literature on the persistence of profit approach 
(McGahan, Porter 1999; Goddard et al. 2005) which may reflect the influence of both industry-level 
and firm-level factors1.  
  
                                                          
1 Goddard, Tavakoli and Wilson (2009), analyzing the sources of variation in profitability and growth for manufacturing 
firms located in eleven European countries, have found that the firm-level effects are the most important class of effect 
in explaining the variation in performance. 
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III. CHARACTERISTICS OF MID-SIZED ITALIAN MANUFACTURING FIRMS 
Mid-sized Italian manufacturing firms are the object of our investigation on profitability. These firms, 
which are joint stock companies, have some special characteristics. They are generally distinguished 
for being family-owned, organized in groups, for having links with industrial districts, a tendency to 
innovate the product continuously, a strong international presence, and a commercial model 
specialized in niches of high quality products in order to defend against manufacturers in low-cost 
countries and large-size multinationals (Colli, 2005, Coltorti, 2006, Coltorti et. al., 2013, Schilirò, 
2011, 2012). As Colli argued (2005) – and the literature on mid-sized Italian companies tends to 
confirm2 –,the intermediate size of companies is not to be intended as a size of transition between the 
small and large, is meant to persist over time and represents a well-structured economic corporate 
system. 
This type of companies, originated in the 1970s, derives from the gradual transformation of Italian 
industry following the globalization of market competition and the declining performances of the 
largest Italian industrial groups.3 In addition, intermediate size firms have been consolidating as a 
result of changes in product demand due to radical changes in consumer behavior and consumption 
pattern. Most of these firms are involved in the production of “Made in Italy” goods and express 
Italy’s long-standing supremacy in food production, clothing, home furnishing, and light mechanic 
(Schilirò, 2010, Coltorti, 2014).  
Italian manufacturing firms of intermediate size are both medium-sized firms employing between 50 
and 499 workers, and medium-large companies employing more than 499 workers.4  
The following features are most commonly found in their business model. These companies make a 
limited use of capital and manage to succeed in international markets by focusing on the quality of 
their workmanship, on the maximization of the value produced per employee (and this translates into 
innovations), on a corporate finance characterized by few debts, and on the ability to manage the 
corporate organization. At the same time, these firms focus on competitive advantages, with the 
intangibles (brand, communication, customer relationships, etc.) as the factors that have increasingly 
acquired importance.5 Since they are able to create market niches, these firms usually operate under 
monopolistic competition. The literature seems to indicate that the Italian manufacturing firms of 
intermediate size enjoy a good and time-persistent profitability compared to both larger and smaller 
companies (see Colli, 2005; Coltorti, 2006, 2012, 2014; Schilirò, 2011). The aim of this paper is to 
                                                          
2 Coltorti (2006, 2008, 2014), Coltorti et al.(2013), Marini (2008), Schilirò (2010, 2011, 2012). 
3 For the transformation and disintegration of large industrial firms due to the globalization, see Feenstra (1998).  
4 See Mediobanca-Unioncamere (2005-2011).  
5 Coltorti and Garofoli (2011); Schilirò (2012).   
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investigate the profitability of the Italian manufacturing firms of intermediate size using panel data 
econometrics in order to detect the determinants of profitability, to evaluate their impact, to highlight 
the presence of persistent profits, and to investigate the firm specific factors. 
 
IV. DATA AND ESTIMATION METHOD 
Our study investigates the profitability of Italian manufacturing firms of intermediate size (medium 
and medium-large firms) using panel data analysis. To identify this category of firms we followed 
the criteria previously adopted in Italy by Mediobanca. These criteria are based on two parameters: 
turnover and number of employees.6 More specifically, the dataset considered takes into account only 
firms with a turnover ranging from €50 million to €3 billion and with a number of employees starting 
from 49. In our analysis, we refer to data published over the years in the Annual Survey of the Leading 
Italian Companies carried out by the Research Unit of Mediobanca.7 We focus on the manufacturing 
firms excluding from the sample both public and service sectors companies. Thus, the sample 
includes 1066 Italian manufacturing firms of intermediate size for the period 2004-2010, all joint 
stock companies, although most of them are not publicly traded.8 Also, since the panel used in the 
analysis is unbalanced, the total annual observations considered are 4267.9   
As confirmed by empirical literature, the choice of using panel data models is justified since this 
approach often tends to outperform time series or cross-section analysis. In fact, longitudinal data 
increase the number of observations by pooling several time periods of data for each firm. This 
determines a more accurate inference of model parameters and a larger set of available estimators. At 
the same time it allows the opportunity of deepening the dynamics of firm behavior.10 
Hereunder, Table 1 shows the variables of the model that we adopt, their expected effect, and 
summary statistics. 
 
[TABLE 1 about here] 
                                                          
6 The conventional criteria limiting the sample have been set forth by the Research Unit of Mediobanca that provided the 
dataset. 
7 Mediobanca, Le principali società italiane, (2005 - 2011). These surveys document financial statements of the leading 
individual Italian companies. 
8 The period under consideration allows to cover different phases of the business cycle; a first phase (2004-2007) and a 
second phase (2008-2010).  
9 The panel is unbalanced since it contains firms entering or leaving the market during the sample period (e.g. due to 
default, mergers). Unbalanced panels are very common in studies of a speciﬁc country’s firm proﬁtability (for a discussion 
on unbalanced panels, see Baltagi, 2013).  
10 Cameron and Trivedi (2011) show that panel data analysis achieve consistent estimations by controlling for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity and the associated biases. 
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In our model, there are three alternatives to measure a firm’s profitability and efficiency: ROA, ROE, 
and PROFIT. 11 More specifically, ROA reflects average return on total gross assets and it is 
calculated on the basis of earnings with respect to company assets consisting of both debt and equity. 
It represents the ability to generate turnover by exploiting the available resources. Therefore, ROA 
indicates the return offered to all the firm’s financial stakeholders. ROE is the return available to 
shareholders after considering tax and others claimants. Finally, PROFIT is calculated as the EBIT 
divided by total assets. The first two ratios are the most commonly used indicators of profitability in 
empirical studies on firm profitability. However, ROE is a sensitive indicator of debt expansion and 
buy-back of shares: these two actions will affect the measure of profitability. In order to examine the 
robustness of our empirical findings, we prefer to adopt three alternative ratios as financial 
performance variables.   
From Table 1, we can derive few interesting clues. Firstly, the average return to equity for the sample 
is about 10.2%, while the average return to asset as whole is 6.16%. Consequently, ROA is smaller 
than ROE, which means that financing costs less than the profit it makes. In other words, the firm is 
making sufficient profit on borrowings to cover the cost of the interest on those funds. Mid-sized 
Italian manufacturing firms often overcome this important financial stress test. Furthermore, for these 
financial ratios, there are not universal value benchmarks, but they should be assessed with regards 
to the sector and time period taken into account. Lastly, PROFIT − the variable that represents the 
net profits on total assets − appears the least volatile profitability indicator, but is also the one with 
the lowest average yearly return (2.27%).     
 
V. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
This section describes the empirical model for the estimation of the firm-level profitability. More 
specifically, in order to assess the many aspects of firm profitability, we conduct an empirical analysis 
by using an econometric model that relates the firm’s performance to a set of explanatory variables 
which includes firm size, risk, and capital structure. More specifically, inspired partly by previous 
empirical literature (e.g., Hawawini et al., 2003; Goddard, Tavakoli and Wilson, 2005; Berger, 
Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006; Coad, 2007; Zeiturn, Tian, 2007; Artiach et al. 2010), we specify a panel 
equation aiming at capturing the potentially relevant factors in determining firm profitability. The 
specification of the static model is the following:  
 
                                                          
11 Both ROA and ROE reveal how well a company uses its financing and assets to create income. 
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The dependent variable PR stands for profitability of the firm i. As it has been pointed out in the 
previous section, we use three alternative proxies for this variable of interest. The three alternatives 
are ROA, ROE, and PROFIT, all continuous variables.  
The determinants of firm profitability, instead, are represented by GR, RISK, TANG, SIZE, and 
LEVERAGE.   
GR is the rate of growth of sales and measures the growth opportunities of the firm. Several empirical 
studies (e.g. Cowling, 2004; Coad, 2007) have shown a positive and significant relationship between 
firm growth and profitability. However, this result is not conclusive. In fact, Davidsson et al. (2009), 
who follow the resource view reasoning, cast doubt on that positive effect and tend to confirm that 
profitable low growth firms are more likely to reach the desirable state of high growth and high 
profitability as well as to have a decreased risk of ending up performing poorly on performance 
dimensions. Hence, we cannot establish an a priori effect for the variable GR.  
RISK is a control variable that measures the standard deviation of ROE over the six-year period for 
each firm. Since when we adopt the ROE ratio as dependent variable the risk component is a function 
of the return on equity, RISK is assumed to be a predetermined variable in the System GMM set-up. 
We introduce this RISK variable in accordance to corporate finance literature. Although riskier firms 
(i.e. firms with higher performance volatility) are expected to generate greater expected return, 
several empirical studies (Berger, Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006; Zeitun, Tian, 2007; Lee, Li, 2012) have 
founded a negative effect of risk on profitability. These authors justified their finding as the result of 
higher operating risk that implies a higher probability of financial distress along with higher bankrupt 
costs, and thereby lowers firm’s performance.  
TANG captures the composition of the asset structure and is calculated as the ratio of physical capital 
divided by the total assets. The relationship of this explicative variable with firm performance may 
be positive, but the effect could revert to negative if the fixed asset is relatively high. This latter 
finding may be ascribed to the decreasing marginal efficiency of the capital. Prior studies (Zeiturn, 
Tian 2007; Artiach et al., 2010) have found an overall negative correlation between the tangibility 
asset and firm profitability. Since firms often invest part of their profits to boost fixed asset, one 
should also bear in mind a possible reverse causation from higher profitability to more tangibility. 
For this reason, we model firm tangibility as an endogenous variable in the System GMM set-up. 
SIZED represents a set of dummy variables included in the model to control for differences associated 
with firm’s size. As in Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006), we include size class dummy variables; 
in our case, the dummies are ranging from below €100 millions in gross total assets (Sized 1) to over 
€5 billion in gross total assets (Sized 4). The control group is the category of the smallest firms (Sized 
1, under €100 millions in gross total assets), while the other estimated dummies (Sized 2, Sized 3, 
9 
 
Sized 4) have to be compared to the benchmark category (Sized 1). Firm’s size influences the 
profitability since it can be a proxy of the firm’s efficiency and therefore the omitted (benchmark) 
variable may represent the most efficient firm.   
Even if some previous studies (e.g., Lee, Li, 2012) have found a non-monotonic effect of the firm’s 
dimension on profit rate or, alternatively, a negative correlation, other studies (Hall, Weiss, 1967; 
Gleason, Mathur, Mathur, 2000; Claver et al., 2002; Tian, Zeiturn 2007; Artiach et al., 2010) in 
contrast, showed a positive and significant coefficient on firms’ profits.12 Hence, the expected effect 
of the relationship between firms’ size and profits is uncertain.  
LEVERAGE is a determinant that captures the influence of corporate capital structure on the firm’s 
performance and is measured as the ratio of financial debt to the gross total assets. Generally, 
corporate governance models predict that leverage influences agency costs and, consequently, affects 
positively firm’s profitability (Harris, Raviv, 1991; Myers, 2001). However, a relatively high leverage 
indicates an anomalous firm’s structure and that the financial expenses became too high. Moreover, 
a further expansion of financial debt may produce significant agency costs of external debt that 
determine risk shifting, or a reduced effort to control risk that may, in turn, result in higher expected 
costs of financial distress, default, or liquidation.13 These agency costs translate into higher interest 
payments for firms to reward debt holders for their expected losses. Furthermore, if we relax the 
Modigliani-Miller (1958) capital structure irrelevance principle, this will imply the presence of an 
external risk premium, i.e. leverage would be more expensive than equity. Finally, several empirical 
analyses (e.g. Tian, Zeitun, 2007; Jang, Park, 2011) have found negative and significant effects of 
leverage on corporate performance. Thus, we expect both leverage and corporate return to be 
negatively related. As for tangibility (TANG), also LEVERAGE is treated as potential endogenous 
variable in the System GMM estimator, as lower profits induce higher financial debt and vice versa.  
The model also contains the constant term β0 and the disturbance component ui,t, the latter term 
consists of two components,  the unobserved firm-specific effect vi, and the idiosyncratic error εi,t.  
According to the persistence of profits literature (McGahan, Porter, 1999; Goddard et al., 2005; 
Mcmillan, Wohar, 2011), firm’s profits show a tendency to persist over time, because of markets 
imperfections, asymmetric information, and market power. Consequently, we also adopt a dynamic 
                                                          
12 Our dataset does not contain the very small firms, in fact the sample starts with firms more than €50 million in total 
assets and /or more than 49 workers. It also does not contain the large companies. 
13 The agency costs of debt are usually explained in terms of asset substitution or of risk-shifting issue. The latent conﬂict 
among debt claimants and equity is such that shareholders expropriate wealth from bondholders by investing in new 
projects that are riskier than those currently held in the company’s portfolio. In this case, shareholders acquire most of 
the gains (i.e., when high-risk projects payoff), while bondholders bear most of the cost (Fama, Miller, 1972; Jensen, 
Meckling, 1976;).  
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equation that includes the dependent variable with two lags14 among the explicative variables. Thus, 
the dynamic specification of our model is: 
 
Where the coefficients λi represent the speed of adjustment to steady state equilibrium. In other words, 
if λi are close to 1, profits are highly persistent, denoting evidence in favor of scarcely competitive 
goods markets. Conversely, values of λi close to 0 imply a highly competitive environment. 
Finally, both equations (1) and (2) do not include temporal dummies to control for time effects. The 
inclusion is not plausible because, across all the specifications, their coefficients are jointly 
statistically insignificant accordingly to the F-Test. 
 
V.1 Univariate Analysis of The Model 
In this section we examine the Pearson correlation coefficients and carry out a univariate analysis of 
the model adopted.  
 
[TABLE 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 reports the cross-correlation coefficient among the variables. In this regard, several 
observations can be made. First, firm’s leverage appears to be the most important factor associated 
with the firm’s low performance, in so supporting the hypothesis that capital structure (agency costs) 
and financial debts influence negatively the profitability, as widely shown in the empirical literature. 
Second, corporate performance is also negatively and significantly related to tangibility, so it is 
consistent with another assumption regarding the decreasing marginal efficiency of physical capital. 
Third, a weaker support was found about the effect of firm’s dimension on profitability; in fact, the 
correlation between size and performance is nearly always statistically insignificant and, in addition, 
the coefficients (Sized 2, Sized 3, Sized 4) are close to zero. This result is also confirmed when the 
number of employees has been adopted as alternative firm’s dimension proxy. However, as it has 
been argued in section 5, the dimensional heterogeneity of the sample is not so relevant here. Fourth, 
preliminary results of the other control variables, namely risk and rate of growth of sales, show 
opposite effects. The first variable (risk) displays a negative and significant correlation with 
                                                          
14 In the specific case of ROE equation, the dependent variable PR is included as explanatory variable only with one lag; 
while the GR variable (i.e. rate of growth of sales) is included with two lags. 
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profitability, while the second (the growth opportunity variable), positively impacts on corporate 
returns, as expected. 
From the point of view of robustness, even if some of the control variables are mutually correlated, 
showing few evidences of collinearity, the magnitude of the coefficients is small.15 
 
V.2 Econometric Specifications 
 
In our empirical analysis, we address the following issues regarding the identification of the model. 
First, we estimate the static specification (namely, equation (1) section 5) by using traditional 
econometric methods such as Ordinary Least Square, Random or Fixed effect model, and the 
Generalized Least Square. Therefore, at this stage, by applying the Chow test, we examine the 
presence of unobserved heterogeneity that makes pooled regression results heavy biased. In our case, 
the Chow test always rejects the null hypothesis. Second, we try to assess, through the Hausman test, 
if the individual effects are fixed or random. The results of the Hausman test suggest adopting the 
fixed effects for the ROA and PROFIT, while for the ROE the proper specification is the Random 
effects specification.   
However, within our study, the models described above might produce biased and inconsistent 
results, particularly for the dynamic specification in equation (2) section 5, because of the potential 
issue of endogeneity, i.e. because the disturbance term of the specification is correlated with the 
explanatory variables, and consequently, will produce biased coefficients and standard errors. To 
overcome this issue, Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) developed the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM henceforth) for panel data analysis, 
this estimator deals with the abovementioned biasedness and inconsistency of the standard model 
applied to the static specification. In particular, Blundell and Bond (1998) deal with the issues caused 
by endogeneity by recurring to lagged and differenced values of the explanatory variables as internal 
instruments.16 Moreover, system GMM estimation in dynamic panel models is robust to control for 
reverse causality, simultaneity bias, and possible omitted variables; while it controls the individual 
and time specific effects. Hence, we address these econometric issues by using a two-step system 
GMM technique (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) estimating a level-equation 
                                                          
15 As Gujarati and Porter (2009) suggest, multicollinearity becomes a serious issue only when the correlation among the 
control variables exceeds the threshold of 0.8. Moreover, the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) test showed no evidence 
for multicollinearity among the model variables (mean VIF values ranged between 1.07 and 1.66). 
16 In the system GMM estimator, the endogenous explanatory variables are instrumented with their lags so that the 
instruments are uncorrelated to the disturbance.  
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as well as a difference equation17. Furthermore, the use of a dynamic equation − such as (2) in section 
5 − is justified because we expect that firm’s profits denote a tendency to persist over time.  
In order to evaluate the validity of our System GMM estimations, we ran two common tests that 
confirm the null hypotheses. The first test is the Arellano–Bond, which confirms the absence of 
second-order autocorrelation in the transformed idiosyncratic errors. The second one is the Sargan 
test, which strongly confirms the soundness of the imposed over-identifying moment conditions and 
consequently the validity of the instruments used. 
In addition, our econometric model takes into account Roodman’s advice (2009) concerning the 
excessive “proliferation” in the number of instruments that may cause over-fitting of the endogenous 
variables and could bias the specification tests of instruments’ joint validity. Therefore, we have 
evaluated the robustness of our GMM results by forcefully cutting the numbers of instruments by 
reducing lag length.18 
Moreover, all GMM regressions adopt the Windmeijer (2005) correction procedure for the estimation 
of standard errors.19 
Finally, to achieve the models dynamic completeness required for the System GMM estimator, we 
include two lagged dependent variables for PROFIT and ROA, whereas for ROE the lagged variable 
is one. We also checked the robustness of the estimates using a balanced sub-sample of our panel 
dataset and found similar results with the full sample. Therefore, we have undertaken a number of 
additional sensitivity analyses, in order to explore the robustness of the results across different model 
specifications. 
In sum, after controlling for the potential endogeneity problem, with the other specifications, our 
main findings of the GMM remain robust and consistent. 
 
VI. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
                                                          
17 We are aware that the system GMM estimator has some critical aspects, as Roodman (2009) has shown regarding the 
instrument proliferation. For this reason we used also alternative methods such as OLS, GLS, Random and Fixed effects 
estimators that confirm the robustness of the results. 
18 As recommended by Roodman (2009), the number of instruments used in a dynamic GMM estimator should relatively 
low and smaller than the number of the number of observations. In our analysis we use 36 instruments for both ROA and 
PROFIT, while 69 instruments have been used for the ROE. Therefore, in both cases the number of instruments is small 
and lesser than our 2217 observations. The “optimal” number of instruments has been achieved by using the restriction 
of one lag for levels and two for differenced equations. In addition, we have done alternative estimations by reducing 
further the number of instruments. Nonetheless, these further reductions worsen the diagnostic tests (specifically, they 
resulted in a lower Sargan p-value), indicating that our selected number of instruments should be fairly “optimal”.  
19 Windmeijer (2005) proposed a correction method for the commonly downward biased estimated standard errors 
produced by the two-step GMM technique. In particular, he corrects the finite sample biases by the estimated asymptotic 
variance of the two-step GMM estimator that produces the corrected adjusted Wald Statistics.  
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In this section, we comment our main results showed in tables 3, 4, and 5 and also discuss the 
robustness checks for the hypothesis tests.  
[TABLE 3,4,5 about here] 
Our inference analysis has been conducted with several specifications. Overall, the results are all 
robust, but – as it has been argued in section 5.2 – system GMM estimation is the optimal method 
that produces the more efficient and consistent coefficients. In support of this hypothesis, the 
coefficients of one period-lagged ROE, PROFIT, and ROA are found to be statistically significant in 
all cases, while they are the highest in terms of magnitude among all the explanatory variables. This 
seems to imply that the Italian economy is far from a perfectly competitive market structure, and that 
mid-sized manufacturing firms tend to segment the market by creating market niches, hence they 
operate in monopolistic competition. 20 
The profitability of mid-sized Italian manufacturing firms tends to be highly persistent over time and, 
therefore, the lagged dependent variable should be included in the regression models. However, the 
application of OLS or Fixed Effect estimators of a dynamic specification would result in biased 
estimated coefficients, because of possible endogeneity of the regressors. Consequently, these 
estimators are likely to perform poorly. Thus, the results of the static models have been reported 
simply for the purpose of comparison, while the last column of each table reports the coefficients of 
reference. On the other hand, all the estimated models denote the presence of some robust regularity 
among the several specifications and alternative profitability ratios used.  
As expected, firm profitability is shown to be larger when sales growth rate is positive. This suggests 
that higher sales growth generates income that partially influences firm’s profits. This positive impact 
is consistent with earlier studies that use the same proxy variable (growth rate of sales) to measure 
growth opportunity ratio,21 but also with other empirical studies that adopt different variables such 
as, for instance, the rate of change in total assets.22 Moreover, in the case of ROE, past growth is 
observed to have a greater positive impact on the subsequent profit rate than contemporaneous 
growth; thus, growth seems to generate dynamic increasing returns. This evidence is in line with 
previous studies (e.g. Coad, 2007).  
Furthermore, the estimated coefficients to capture the risk contribute to firm’s performance are 
negative and almost always statistically significant, i.e. safer companies show higher profits than 
riskier firms. This is consistent with prior studies (Bonaccorsi, Berger, 2006; Tian, Zeiturn, 2007; 
                                                          
20 Migliardo (2012) found evidence of high degree of market power in the Italian firms over the same sample period taken 
into consideration in the present study.  
21 Cowling (2004) and Coad (2007) have shown a significant and positive correlation between sales growth and profits.  
22 E.g. Zeitun and Tian (2007), Nunes et al. (2009). 
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Lee, Li, 2012). Moreover, the negative correlation is more than proportional in the case of the return 
on equity ratio,  as a 1% increase in profit volatility determines a reduction in profits of 1.36% for 
ROE. In sum, volatility of earnings reduces the value of firms. This finding can be ascribed to the 
higher risk of default that induces a greater probability of financial distress and larger bankruptcy 
costs, and, consequently, downgrades firm profits.  
The effect of tangibility on profitability at the sample mean is statistically significant (for ROA and 
PROFIT) and negative (in all other cases). Firms with relatively large levels of tangible assets are 
less profitable, and this suggests that the Italian manufacturing firms of intermediate size tend to use 
their fixed assets inefficiently. More specifically, they invest excessively in physical capital over the 
total assets, and since the marginal efficiency of capital is decreasing, this worsens corporate 
performance.  
In general, the estimated equations show that the firm’s size does not affect the pattern of firm’s 
performance;23 the latter being almost stable along all size classes. This result might be ascribed to 
the sample structure of our analysis and justifies why the relationship SIZE-PROFIT is weak. 
On average and as expected, the leverage variable is negative and significant for all the measures of 
profitability used. An expansion in the debt ratio of 1% determines a reduction of corporate returns 
from 0.08% for ROA up to 0.96% for ROE respectively. This indicates that capital structure is too 
unbalanced toward the financial debt. There are several possible theoretical explanations for our 
findings. In more detail, such inverse relationship between firm value (ROE) and leverage is justified 
in literature  by the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 24 According to it, the firms 
finance their investments at first with internal resources, i.e. profitable firms use their earnings 
primary; once the endogenous funds are used up, the companies turn to debt financing. Finally, they 
opt to capital share increase as a last source of funding. Several reasons explain this hierarchy of 
financing sources: first, the asymmetric information in the financial markets increases the cost of 
issuing equity25; second, old shareholders tend to limit the emission in order to retain control of the 
company; third, the internal financing strategy allows transaction cost saving. In summary, a 
profitable company uses less leverage and in so doing determines a higher firm’s value that will be 
positively correlated with corporate performance and negatively linked with the debt. So the results 
of this study are consistent with the pecking order theory. 
                                                          
23 Alternatively, we also used either the raw size variable referred to total assets in logarithm term, and the natural 
logarithm of the number of employees, but in both cases size proved not to be an important factor for firm profitability.  
24 The pecking order theory of capital structure affirms that, all other things being equal, companies seeking to finance a 
new project or product have a hierarchy of preferred financing options progressing from the most to the least preferred. 
25 The new equity issuing leads to a firm’s stock price decline, because investors perceive that managers consider the 
company overvalued. Thus, the investors are monetizing this overvaluation. As a consequence, the firm’s value decreases 
and whilst the cost of external financing increases.  
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Moreover, the significant and negative correlation of the other proxy (ROA and PROFIT) dependent 
variables with leverage can be explained by agency conflicts causing overleveraged firms and 
adversely affecting their profitability negatively.  
In the context of our analysis, the negative relation can be ascribed to several idiosyncratic reasons. 
On the one hand, mid-sized Italian manufacturing firms seem to choose debt (bank debt) instead of 
equity, owing to either legal market restrictions (e.g. company profile) and/or credit conditions, which 
do not allow the recourse to financial markets. On the other hand, tax purposes can address this 
strategic choice, i.e. firms opt to debt rather than internal capital, because companies benefit from 
debt tax shields (Modigliani, Miller, 1963). 
Finally, for mid-sized Italian manufacturing firms, the previous year’s corporate performance has 
significant positive impact on ROA and PROFIT, while, by contrast, a large ROE implies a decrease 
of profitability in the following year.26 This remarkable result can be ascribed to a weak forward-
looking strategy of profit management, as it is highlighted by a strategy of overpaid dividends that 
jeopardizes the performance in the long run.   
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This study provides a further contribution to the extensive empirical literature on firm profitability. 
It focuses on mid-sized Italian manufacturing firms, namely medium and medium-large enterprises, 
which represent the most dynamic and profitable companies characterizing Italian economy. Firm-
specific determinants on profitability and the relationship between corporate structure and firm 
performance are highlighted.  
Several concluding remarks can be drawn from our results. First, since firm returns denote the 
tendency to persist over time, showing a good resilience, we find support to the persistence of profit 
hypothesis27. This may prove that mid-sized Italian manufacturing firms operate in a context of 
monopolistic competition, hence they are able to create market niches by specializing in high quality 
products,  differentiating the products, but also being able to establish a customized relationship with 
their clients. Second, as referred to both leverage and tangibility, mid-sized Italian manufacturing 
firms’ capital structure looks unbalanced. Our findings prove that financial debt (i.e. leverage) is 
relatively high with negative impact on firm profits. Physical assets (tang) tend to be outsized, this 
affects negatively firm performance, because tangible capital is subject to decreasing return to scale. 
                                                          
26In general, we would expect a positive sign for the lagged dependent variable. Nonetheless the negative effects for the 
specific case of ROE ratio (Table 3) is due to the high dividend payments.   
27 Although we know that even the profitability of mid-sized Italian firms has deteriorated in the period 2007-2010 due 
to the global crisis (Cerved, 2014). 
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Moreover, our empirical evidence suggests that present growth of sales (and in the case of return on 
equity also growth occurred in the past) as well as profit volatility (i.e. risk) are important and 
significant determinants of firm profitability.  
In sum, our empirical analysis supplies additional insights for managers as well as for planners of 
economic policy. The results provide several managerial implications for Italian manufacturing 
companies of intermediate size. Our evidence indicates that profitable manufacturing firms could 
achieve better returns, if they adopted a diversification in their financial funding strategy and/or if 
they modified their allocation of business assets, e.g. by intensifying their intangible assets. From the 
point of view of the economic policy planner, our results could suggest the adoption of fiscal 
incentives in order to induce adjustments in the capital structure of this type of firms and, 
consequently, to enhance their profitability.  
Potential extensions of the present study might be an investigation on medium size European 
manufacturing companies and/or an evaluation of our results within a macroeconomic framework 
such as DSGE models.  
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TABLE 1 
Definitions, notations, and the expected effect of the explanatory variables of model on firm 
profitability, 2004-2010  
Variable Definition 
Expected 
effect 
mean s. d. 
Endogenous Variables     
ROE Return on equity  0.1025 1.1149 
Profit Net profits divided by total assets  0.0227 0.0727 
ROA Return on assets (T.A.)  0.0616 0.0804 
     
Explanatory Variables     
Dimensional Dummy     
sized1 
Dummy equal to 1 if T. A. is less than 
100 million 
Benchmark 
0.4473 0.4973 
sized2 
Dummy equal to 1 if T. A. is greater 
than 100 million and less than 500 mill. 
Positive 
0.4001 0.4900 
sized3 
Dummy equal to 1 if T. A. is greater 
than 500 million and less than 1 bill. 
Positive 
0.0941 0.2920 
sized4 
Dummy equal to 1 if T. A. is greater 
than 1 billion and less than 5 bill. 
Positive 
0.0585 0.2348 
tang Fixed assets to total assets Undefined 0.2230 0.1538 
Leverage Financial Debt to total assets Negative 0.2660 0.1935 
risk 
Standard deviation over time of the 
firm’s return on equity 
Positive 
0.2133 0.7371 
Growth opportunities Rate of Growth of Sales  Positive 0.0520 0.3316 
     
No. obs 4267    
No. of Firms 1066    
The data are averages from annual observations referring to 2004-2010. 
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TABLE 2  
Pearson’s Correlation Matrix of the Variables, during 2004-2010 
 roe Prof. ROA sized1 sized2 sized3 sized4 tang Leverage risk growth nworkers 
roe 1.000            
Prof. 0.035** 1.000           
ROA 0.030** 0.784*** 1.000          
sized1 0.016 -0.049*** -0.026* 1.000         
sized2 -0.012 0.029* 0.013 -0.746*** 1.000        
sized3 -0.004 0.026* 0.023 -0.291*** -0.257*** 1.000       
sized4 -0.003 0.013 0.002 -0.219*** -0.193*** -0.075*** 1.000      
tang -0.027* -0.182*** -0.192*** -0.133*** 0.087*** 0.040*** 0.055*** 1.000     
Leverage -0.032** -0.397*** -0.347*** -0.025 0.011 0.006 0.027* 0.214*** 1.000    
risk -0.142*** -0.093*** -0.080*** 0.010 0.000 -0.004 -0.019 -0.080*** 0.042** 1.000   
growth 0.040** 0.098*** 0.118*** -0.039** 0.033* 0.003 0.011 -0.053*** -0.034 -0.018 1.000  
N° workers -0.007 -0.013 0.004 -0.361*** -0.105*** 0.364*** 0.547*** 0.089*** -0.058*** 0.000 -0.005 1.000 
             
t statistics in parentheses Note: Statistically significant at the *10%, **5% and ***1% level.  
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TABLE 3 
 OLS, fixed effect and Random effect for the profitability ROE 
ROE OLS Random-effect Fixed-effect GLS System GMM 
growth 0.0948 0.0659* 0.0452* 0.0904*** 0.4162*** 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.08) 
risk -0.3388* -0.2523 0.0 -0.2234*** -1.3617** 
 (0.19) (0.24) (0.00) (0.02) (0.61) 
tang -0.4541*** -0.4682*** -0.5816*** -0.3618*** -0.2826 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.20) (0.01) (0.46) 
sized2 0.0189 0.0582 0.1205 0.0357*** -0.0706 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.15) (0.00) (0.13) 
sized3 0.0390 0.0691 0.2287 0.0243*** -0.0837 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.15) (0.01) (0.10) 
sized4 0.0035 0.0461 0.2781* 0.0048 0.1875 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.15) (0.00) (0.15) 
Leverage -0.6728*** -0.8725*** -0.9183*** -0.5355*** -0.9633*** 
 (0.14) (0.17) (0.18) (0.01) (0.40) 
constant 0.4387*** 0.4742*** 0.3882*** 0.3549*** 0.633763*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.01) (0.21) 
L.roe     -0.5546*** 
     (0.22) 
L.growth     0.6016*** 
     (0.12) 
No. obs. 3092 3092 3092 3092 2217 
No. of firms 839 839 839 839 664 
R2 0.072  0.007   
Wald-test     2(9)=61.15 
AR(1)     z=-1.1723 
     p-value=0.24 
AR(2)     z= -1.13 
     p-value=0.26 
Sargan-test     2(59)=59.38 
     p-value=0.46 
No of 
instruments 
    69 
Note: Statistically significant at the *10%, **5% and ***1% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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TABLE 4 
OLS, fixed effect and Random effect for the profitability variable PROFIT. 
Prof. OLS Random-effect Fixed-effect GLS System GMM 
growth 0.0161* 0.0153** 0.0125** 0.017*** 0.0563*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
risk -0.0104*** -0.0106*** 0.0 -0.0075*** -0.0349* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.0) (0.00) (0.02) 
tang -0.0671*** -0.0831*** -0.1668*** -0.6291*** -0.0901*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) 
sized2 0.0097*** 0.0130*** 0.0224*** 0.0072*** -0.0067* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
sized3 0.0149** 0.0238*** 0.0531*** 0.0098*** 0.0333** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) 
sized4 0.0142* 0.0237*** 0.0631*** 0.0119*** 0.028 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) 
Leverage -0.1370*** -0.1609*** -0.1908*** -0.1254*** -0.0985** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) 
cons 0.0694*** 0.0756*** 0.0924*** 0.0663*** 0.8682 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
L. Prof     0.3465*** 
     (0.12) 
L2. Prof     0.0268 
     (0.11) 
      
No. obs. 3092 3092 3092 3092 2217 
No. of firms 839 839 839 839 664 
R2 0.197  0.105   
Wald-test     2(13)=164.97 
AR(1)     z= -4.03 
     p-value=0.00 
Ar(2)     z=-0.69 
     p-value=0.49 
Sargan-test     2(22)=15.86 
     p-value=0.82 
Number of 
instruments 
    36 
Note: Statistically significant at the *10%, **5% and ***1% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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TABLE 5 
 OLS, fixed effect and Random effect for the profitability ROA 
ROA OLS Random-effect Fixed-effect GLS System GMM 
growth 0.0230 0.0211** 0.0187* 0.0247*** 0.0927*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) 
Risk -0.0108 -0.0082 0.0 -0.0089*** -0.0489 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.0) (0.00) (0.04) 
Tang -0.0838*** -0.0981*** -0.1468*** -0.0803*** -0.0931** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) 
sized2 0.0079* 0.0089* 0.0144** 0.0081*** -0.0055 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
sized3 0.0130* 0.0201*** 0.0413*** 0.0131*** 0.0269** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
sized4 0.0119 0.0168** 0.0440*** 0.0116*** 0.0143 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) 
Leverage -0.1312*** -0.1371*** -0.1553*** -0.1214*** -0.0777* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.04) 
Cons 0.1112*** 0.1137*** 0.1225*** 0.1066*** 0.0939*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) 
L.ROA     0.4609*** 
     (0.15) 
L.ROA 2     -0.1312 
     (0.13) 
      
No. obs. 3092 3092 3092 3092 2217 
No. of firms 839 839 839 839 664 
Wald-test     2(12)=189.91 
AR(1)     z=-5.54 
     p-value=0.00 
AR(2)     z=-0.10 
     p-value=0.91 
Sargan-test     2(69)=28.14 
     p-value=0.17 
Number of 
instruments 
    36 
Note: Statistically significant at the *10%, **5% and ***1% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
